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for which she was 
!d.--Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-An em-
cannot be required to of his compensation 
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though it occurs in a location not 
or controlled by the employer. 
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Place of Injury.--In order that an 
employee may be considered as being on her 
ises at the time of injury, it is not 
the be circumscribed walls or 
under the 
[5] Id.-Evidence.---On a hearing of an application for an award 
for injuries su:stained by a counselor of Girl Scouts while on a 
recreational horseback ride during her free a letter 
written by the exe<'utive director of the county Girl Scout 
Council to the counselor's attorney containing a statement that 
the counselor's recreation was considered a part of the com-
pensation and that it "was so intended" at the time of em-
ployment should have been admitted in evidence when it was 
offered in the director's absence, but refusal to admit it did 
not constitute prejudicial error where the director testified at 
a later hearing to the same effect. 
[6] Id.-Certiorari-Review.-Where there is no real dispute as 
to the facts, whether an injury was suffered in the course of 
employment is a question of law and a purported finding of 
fact on that question is not binding on a reviewing court. 
PHOCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission denying compensation for personal injuries. 
Order annulled. 
Hennigan & Ryueal for Petitioner. 
Everett A. Corten, Bdward A. Sarkisian and Herlihy & 
Herlihy for Respondents. 
CARTER, ,J.-This is a proceeding to review an order of 
the Industrial Accident Commission which denied an applica-
tion for compensation for personal injuries on the ground 
that said injuries were not suffered in the course of em-
ployment. 
Petitioner, Joanne Reinert, a minor, was employed by the 
Central Orange County Girl Scout Council at a camp which 
it conducted for Girl Scouts in the San Bernardino }\fountains. 
Mrs. Mary K. Scholler was executive director of the council, 
camp director of the summer camp and was in charge of 
employment for the council. Although the council had con-
ducted summer camps in previous years, this was the first 
time at this particular location which had been leased for 
the season from a church. The leased camp grounds com-
HEIXER1' v. 1 NDUS'l'RIAL Ace. COIIL 
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5 acres on which were located the main lodge, 
sleeping Almost 
were located off the camp 
, 1954, ·when petitioner and Mrs. Scholler discussed 
Mrs. Scholler explained that horseback 
assistant counselor younger Girl Scouts 
be of her duties; that while on such duty she 
pay no charge for the horse; that when she had any 
time she would be privileged, upon obtaining permission 
Mrs. Scholler, to go riding. Petitioner was told by 
Scholler at the time of the interview that part of the 
for the work was the availability of recreational 
as a counselor which would not otherwise be avail-
able to her. Petitioner was engaged as assistant waterfront 
dirPctor by the council by a written contract covering the 
from June 30th, 1954, to July 30th, 1954, at a wage 
for the period. She was informed that this ·wage 
would not come "close" to paying for all the services she 
rendered but it was hoped that while at camp she would be 
abh· to take advantage of all the recreational facilities avail-
able; that it was hoped that ''you will also have been com-
to some extent" by those recreational facilities. 'I' he 
fact that petitioner enjoyed horseback riding and intended to 
engagP in that sport >vas discussed at the interview. 
employee was on duty 24 hours a day except for one 
24-bour period each week. During the on-duty hours if the 
was not needed for the actual work of the camp 
slw upon obtaining permission, engage in recreational 
actiYities of her own choosing. When her duties so permitted, 
slw was required to obtain permission for the precise recre-
ariuual activity a\Yay from the camp in which she wished to 
Prior to her injury, petitioner had gone horseback riding 
soJlh' six times, three of them without charge to her because 
shto rode as a counselor accompanying Girl Scouts and three 
t for her own recreation for which she was charged a 
rt'riuced rate of $1.00 per hour by the stable. Horses were 
at vvilson 's Stables located a half mile from the 
camp through an arrangement whereby the campers and coun-
selors could ride at a lower rate than that charged the general 
July 30th, the day petitioner received her injuries, the 
group of Girl Scouts had left the camp at around noon. 
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counselors aiso left at that but 
and other counselors to close up camp, pack the 
ment and prepare it for into trucks which were to 
Petitioner and some of the other conn-
Mrs. Scholler, had made plans a day or two 
earlier to go for a final horseback ride and swim the 
aftrrnoon of the 30th after which were to return to 
camp for the final and clearing up to loading. 
Mrs. Scholler received a call elsewhere and was unable to go 
on the ride but granted permission to petitioner and the other 
younger counselors to go on the horseback ride. 
At ·wilson's Stables petitioner mounted a horse chosen for 
her by the attendant at the stable and started off to ride along 
a bridle path n0arest to the camp. After a few minutes the 
horse bolted and petitioner was thrown to the ground and 
rendered unconscious. She was discovered later and taken 
to a hospital. 
Petitioner's injuries are not in dispute. She is paralyzed 
and will remain so for the rest of her life. T n addition to 
the transection of the spinal cord, she suffered broken ribs, 
broken maxilla, traumatic heart damage and lung damage. 
The only question involved here is whether petitioner's 
injuries were suffered in the course of her employment. Re-
spondents argue that they were not because of two factors: 
( 1) That the accident occurred while petitioner was riding 
for her own recreation; and (2) that it occurred at a location 
off the premises of the employer and not under its control. 
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that an injury is 
compensable even though it arose from an activit~- not pri-
marily for the benefit of the employer, provided that such 
activity is related to the employment or contemplated as part 
of the employment, and that the fact that the injury occurred 
on premises not directly owned or controlled by the employer 
is immaterial so long as the injury arose out of the employ-
ment. 
The day the accident occurred, July 30th, was covered 
by the terms of the written contract entered into between 
petitioner and her employer and is sufficient to show that her 
employment had not terminated despite the argument of re-
Rpondents that petitioner "volunteered" to remain and assist 
in the closing of the camp and the packing and loading of the 
equipment. We have then to determine whether the recre-
ational horseback ride for which petitioner was granted per-
mission was contemplated as part of her employment. 
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that 
allC\ their eonr~:;;dors. 
lndcm. Co. . Industria! 26 Ca1.2d 
P .2d G25 , where an ('lll 
in a n:servoir whilf: on his way to hi'l employer's 
collect his pay, vve held: '"l'he mrre fad that an 
ic: performing a. personal act when illjured (loes not 
him without the purview of tlw compensation 
hl\' '!'he te;;t is slated in Employers' efc. Corp. v. Industrial 
Com., :n CaL\pp.2d 567, :J7:l [!J9 P.2d 10891: 'The lrne 
hr deriwd from the casPs is t}J at Uw injury is com-
if receiw•r1 while the employee is doing thosr reason-
whieh his contraet of cmploymrnt expressly or 
authori11es him to do.' " In Phocni;{ Indem .. Co. v. 
Iw!trsfl'ial Ace. Com., ill Cal.2d 8GG, 861 [1D3 P.2d 74:3], wherf: 
a :lot ·was killed while taking llis you11g d~mghter for an air-
ride, 'We held that: " .. < although it may be conceded 
th;ti Hamilton \Yas deriving a prrsonal benefit from i he flight 
his clanght er 's aptitude for flying, this 'does 
se bring him without the puniew of the (:ompemation 
la\\ . '"J'he trne rule ... is that the injnry is eompen-
il rreeivecl while the employee iN r1oing those reasonable 
whid1 his ,<ontract of employment expressly or impliedly 
ai!!J,\rizes him to do."' (Pacific Indcm. Co. Y. lnclusiriaJ 
.A 26 Cal.2d 509, 513 il69 P.2d 625] ). Benefits to 
, or to the employee, are not mutually exclusive, 
lUI': 'where the rmployee is eo:nbining his O\Yll bnsiness with 
his employer, or attrm1ing to both at snbstantially the 
no nice inquiry ·will be made as to ·which business 
aetually c11gaged in at the time of injnry, nnless it 
appears that ll(~ither c\irrct.ly or indirectly could he 
ly\en serving his employer.' ( Locklwed Aircraft Corp. v. 
slrial Ace. Com., 28 Ca1.2d 7GG, 758-9 fJ72 P.2c1 Jl.)" 
Cas. Inrlmn. Exch. v. lndnsfrial Ace. Corn., 21 
7:)1, 738, 760 [135 P.2d 158], the in:jured employee 
implied consent of her employer to go on personal 
46 C.2d-12 
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errands working hours. The court there said that it 
was not indispensable to recovery that the employee be 
rendering service to his employer at the time of the injury 
if the act was contemplated by the employment. It was there 
held that any reasonable doubt as to whether an act was 
contemplated by the employment, in view of this state's liberal 
policy of construction in favor of the employee, should be 
resolved in favor of the employee. (See also Heaton v. 
Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716, 720 [166 P.2d 857] ; Employers' etc. 
Cm·p. v. Indust1·ial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d 
1089] ; IV estern Pipe etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 49 
Cal.App.2d 108 [121 P.2d 35] .) The record here clearly 
shows that petitioner's wage was low; that it had been diffi-
cult to procure counselors for the camp ; that it was specifically 
contemplated by the employer that the use of the available 
recreational facilities was considered "compensation" for the 
long hours and exacting work. 
The present case, although a much stronger one factually, 
is very like that of Winter v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 129 Cal. 
App.2d 174, 176, 177 l276 P.2d 689], where the court annulled 
an order of the commission which denied 'lompensation to a 
caddy who lost an eye as a result of being struck by a 
golf balL The caddy was permitted to play, without charge 
on his day off, on the golf course where he was employed. 
At the time of his employment, the caddy did not know that 
such permission could be obtained. It was during such free 
play on his day off when he received his injury. The court 
held that the injury was sustained in the course of petitioner's 
employment; that it was not indispensable to recowry that 
the employee be rendering a service to the employer at the 
time of injury; and as an additional argument in favor of 
recovery, the court said: ''The essential prerequisite to 
compensation is that the danger from which the injury results 
be one to which he is exposed as an employee in his particular 
employment. (lndustrialindem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
95 Cal.App.2d 804, 809 [214 P.2d 41] .) " The court said, 
further, that "He [petitioner] was engaged at the time in a 
recreational activity, both permitted and, in the light of the 
facts, sufficiently encouraged by the employer, which permis-
sion and encouragement were conditioned solely upon the fact 
that he was a caddy employed by the club. For that reason, 
and for no other, he was permitted to play on the course .... 
Concerning recreational activities, and as to when injuries 
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.. activities are 
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They occur on the premises during a 
period as a regular incident of the em-
says the author, is whether or not the 
'is an and normal one, since 
becomes a regular incident and condition of the 
... 'fhe must be shown to have achiPved 
as a custom or practice either in the industry 
or in this particular plaee. ' " In Satchell v. 
Ace. 94 Cal.App.2d 473, 478 [210 P.2d 867], 
an employee died after having· drunk cleaning fluid 
it was whiskey, the court said that the drinking of 
nuder the circumstanees related 1vas to be anticipated 
the conditions of his employment, and held that ''It 
is too well settled to admit of question that an injury is 
if the employee is at the time engaged in doing 
he might reasonably have been expected to do while 
performance of his duty. (Leffert v. Industrial Ace. 
219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911]; Pacific Indcm. Co. v. 
Ace. Com., 26 Oal.2d 509, 513 [159 P.2a 625]; 
Lockheed A£rcraft Corp. v. Industrial Ace. C01n., 28 Oal.2d 
75fi [172 P.2d 1] ; Elliott v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 21 Cal.2d 
281 [181 P.2d 521, 144 A.L.R 358] .) " (See also Industrial 
Inrlem. Co. v. Industn·az Ace. Com., 95 Oal.App.2d 804, 809 
P.2d 41]; City & County of San Ii'rancisco v. lrldustrial 
"ice. Cow., 61 Oal.App.2cl 248, 261 [142 P.2d 760]; lVhiting-
.llnrd Commercial Co. v. Ind?tstrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505, 
;)()8 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518] .) [1] We conclude, 
that recreational horseback riding was considered 
by both employer and employee as part of the compensation; 
tha such consideration v\·as the practice of the employer; and 
tlwt the dangee from which the injury resulted was "one 
to \\·hich he [ tlw employee J is exposed as an employee in 
his partieular <>mployment." (Winter v. Industrial Ace. 
Cmn., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 176 [276 P.2d 689]; Associated 
Iudnn. Y. l!ldustrial Ace. Com., 18 Oal.2d 40, 44 [112 
P GJ51; CalifoJ·nia Cas. Indcm.. Exch. v. Industrial Ace. 
Co111 190 Cal. 43:3, 436 [213 P. 257].) Here, as in the Winter 
cas". itioner 's i11juries arose from the very risk to which 
she exposed as part of her dnties····riding as a <·ounselor 
the Oirl Scouts. 
"\s we held i11 Truck Ins. E:n~l1. \'. Industn:at Ace. 
27 Oal.2d 813,819 [167 P.2d 705], "An employe cannot 
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be to 
relieve the employer 
to receive the were in+""""" 
contract of employment,' and 'The medium of 
which wages to be paid is a mere accidental 
stance and should not be to cloud the issue.' 
[ 46 C.2d 
Fund v. Industrial Ace. , supra, 194 
34-35 P. Indern. Co. v. 
Ace. Corn. Cal.2d 514 (159 
625)].)" 
The second argument made is that the 
injury occurred off the employer's premises in a location not 
directly owned or controlled and that the cases of 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 39 Cal.2d 
529 [247 P.2d 707], and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Corn., 39 Cal.2d 512 [247 P.2d 697], are directly in 
point. In both cases employees engaging in recreational activ-
ities during time off from work were injured off the employer's 
premises. Both cases are readily distinguishable from the one 
under consideration. In the Fireman's Fund case, the em-
ployee was injured off the employer's premises where her 
activities would not normally take her; neither were such 
activities contemplated at the time of employment as part 
of her compensation. In the case at bar, it was contemplated 
at the time of employment that the very activity causing 
petitioner's injuries would be engaged in as part of the com-
pensation for her employment; it was further contemplated 
that the very premises on which she was injured would be 
used by her in engaging in that activity. In the Liberty 
Mutual case, swimming was purely a personal diversion on 
the part of the injured claimant; it had not been discussed 
at the time of his employment; it played no part in the 
compensation for the employment as petitioner's horseback 
riding did in the case at bar. No permission to swim was 
given the claimant in the Liberty Mutual case; specific per-
mission to ride was given petitioner here. 
[3] There is ample authority to support petitioner's con-
tention that an injury is compensable if it results from an 
activity contemplated by the employment, even though it 
occurs in a location not directly owned or controlled by the 
employer (State Camp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
194 Cal. 28, 31 [227 P. 168] ; Associated lnclem. Corp. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 18 Cal.2d 40, 45 [112 P.2d 615] ; 
Freire v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal.2d 8, 11 [118 P.2d 
8 
357 
>Ve held in Associal eel I ndem. 
Cal.2d 40, 45 P.2d 615], 
may be considered as upon his employer's premises 
time of the it is not necessarily essential that 
be circumscribed by walls or barriers (21Jakins v. 
Ace. 198 Cal. 698 [247 P. 202, 49 A.L.R. 
) ; nor that the same be wholly under the control of the 
(Globe Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 208 
P. ; Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
181 Cal. 300 [184 P. 1]; Starr Piano Co. v. Industrial 
181 Cal. 433 [184 P. 860].)" The employee in 
the Associated case was on some railroad tracks ·when he was 
and the court concluded that he was on the premises 
the consent and approval of his employer, and was 
his duties thereon in going from the depot to the 
Petitioner contends that she >vas denied due process 
because of the referee's refusal to admit in evidence 
written by .M:rs. Scholler to petitioner's counsel. The 
contained a statement that the counselors' recreation 
>vas considered part of their compensation and that it ''was 
'' at the time of their employment. It is apparent 
letter constituted an admission and should have been 
in evidence when it \Yas offered at the first hearing 
Mrs. Scholler was not available as a witness. She testi-
at a later hearing to the same effect when 
''I mentioned at the time of the interview [with 
vYe do say that the compensation by no means 
we are trying to pay you for your services but 
recognize it is just a very little bit but we hope that 
you are there you will also have been compensated to 
some extent to take advantage of the recreational opportunity 
that you can do as a counselor that you can't do ordinarily." 
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~~-.c··-~·v·- added.) In view of the above and the 
liberal rules of evidence prevailing in the Industrial Accident 
Commission hearings (Lab. Code, § 5708) it does not appear 
that petitioner was prejudiced in any way by the exclusion 
of the letter. 
Respondents' final contention is that whether or not an 
was suffered in the course of is one of 
fact and that the finding of the commission is conclusive. 
[6] Where, as here, there is no real dispute as to the facts, 
the question of whether an injury was suffered in the course 
of employment is one of law and a purported finding of fact 
on that question is not binding on an appellate court (Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 CaL 782, 783 [151 P. 277, L.R.A. 
1916E 916]; Hines v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 184 CaL 1, 4 [192 
P. 859, 14 A.L.R. 720]; Crown City Lodge v. Indttstrial Ace. 
Corn., 10 Cal.App.2d 83, 87 [51 P.2d 143]; San Diego 1'. & S. 
Bank v. County of San Diego, 16 Cal.2d 142, 153 [105 P.2d 
94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ) . 
Particularly applicable in this connection is the holding in 
WinterY. Industr·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 178-179 
l276 P.2d 689], where the court, in annulling an order of the 
commission denying compensation, had this to say: ''The 
respondent commission argues that even if it be conceded an 
award could be made upon the fads presented here, yet the 
issue was one of fact to be resolYed by the commission, and 
that the commission's resolution cannot be set aside on 
review. \Ve do not agree. The facts themselves are without 
dispute and hence the issue is one of law unless opposing 
inferences can be drawn, one set supporting an award, the 
other supporting the denial thereof. \V e think no such oppos-
ing inferences are permissible here and that the undisputed 
facts compel the conclusion that petitioner's injury arose out 
of and in the course of his employment. It was the employ-
ment which created the facts and conditions that brought 
petitioner to the premises of his employer to engage in the 
permitted and encouraged recreational activity. 'l'he course of 
the flying golf ball could only be intercepted at one place 
and the presence there of petitioner was due to his employ-
ment.'' The same holding applies with equal force here. 
It was the employment which created the conditions which 
brought petitioner to engage in the permitted and encouraged 
recreational activity. The question is, therefore, one of law 
for this court to decide. It appears to us that petitioner's 
c 
t 
~)561 HEIXERT v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. Cmr. 
[46 C.2d 349; 294 P.2d 713] 
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occurred in and arose out of the course of her em-
is annulled. 
ancl 'l'raynor, J., concurred. 
dissent. 
l"'uu.'-'"·" commission found that Miss Reinert ''did 
noL sustain any injury arising out of or occurring in the 
of said employment.'' The majority opinion annuls 
based upon this finding and concludes as a matter 
that the injury here "occurred in and arose out of 
il~<' eonrse of her employment." I am of the view that the 
opinion has usurped the fact-finding function of 
the eommission by drawing inferenees ·which are contrary 
to tl10se drmn1 by the eommission, and in some instances, con-
to the evidence itself; and that the majority opinion has 
reaehed conclusions whieh eannot be justified. 
Reinert ·was employed as a lifeguard and swimming 
eomJselor at the Girl Scout Camp following her interview 
with Mrs. Scholler. The recreational features of the work 
discussed at the interview as well as the arrangements 
frre time during which the members of the staff could 
lea the camp and do anything that they might choose to do. 
::\o emphasis was placed upon the particular nature of any 
time activity such as horseback riding, nor was Miss 
I tPi ncrt thereafter "required to obtain permission for the 
recreational activity away from camp in which she 
\Yished to engage,'' as indicated in the majority opinion. 
\Yith respect to horseback riding, Miss Reinert testified as 
follows: '' Q. Did she (Mrs. Seholler) say something about 
any opportunities to go horseback riding by yourself 
or when you were not with the little girls? A. \Veil, I don't 
remember ·whe1 her she (lid or not." :Miss Heinert learned after 
at camp that she could go horseback riding in her free 
on payment of $1.00 per hour to ·wilson's Stables, which 
the fixed charge for ''all organized camps-whether camp-
or staff personnel.'' 
Under the evidence, the referee of the commission reported 
''It is my opinion that the claimant in exercising her 
on the afternoon of July 30, 1954, to join with other 
in horseback riding did not engage in any activity 
whieh can be designated as arising out of and occurring m 
thr course of her employment.'' And the commission, in 
360 REINERT v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [46 C.2d 
said that ''. . . there 
could be awarded 
be held to arise out of and occur iu the course 
" It further said: "It is true that many 
are attractive because of recreational 
which are available in the of the of 
This in the of the 
sion of the mantle of the ' 
over such recreational facilities so as to make an 
tained while the employee enjoys such recreation 
sable.'' 
The facts in the present case are neither unusual nor com-
plicated. The record presents the ordinary situation where 
an employee accepts a particular employment because of the 
desirable nature of the work and because of the opportunities 
afforded during her free time for recreational activities which 
she enjoys. It is a matter of common knowledge that many 
persons accept such desirable employment each year in the 
recreational camps of our character building agencies, receiv-
ing their sustenance and little or no additional compensation. 
Similarly, many persons accept employment each year with 
commercial enterprises in our resort areas. No doubt, most 
of these persons are induced, at least to some extent, to accept 
such employment by the lure of the numerous recreational 
activities which may be enjoyed by the employees in their 
free time. Thus, in a very loose sense of the word, it may 
be said that they find some ''compensation'' in the enjoyment 
of their free time activities, but it cannot be said that these 
free time activities, away from the premises of the employer 
and beyond the sphere of any right of control by the employer, 
constitute "part of the employment" or "part of the compen-
sation to be paid by the employer for petitioner's work," as 
stated in the majority opinion. The employer here paid 
nothing, directly or indirectly, in connection with the em-
ployees' free time horseback riding but, on the contrary, the 
employees paid directly to the stable all charges which they 
incurred for such riding. 
It is significant that neither the place where the accident 
occurred, the equipment being used, or the nature of the 
activity was such as to give the employer any right of control 
of the employee's free time recreational activity at the time 
and place where the injury occurred. The stable was con-
ducted by an independent third party at a location approxi-
mately lYz miles from the camp of the employer and the 
361 
Water 
, and Arabian American OU Co. v. Industrial 
94 OaLApp.2d 388 P.2d 732], in which 
was denied to who were while 
in the permitted use of their employers' equipment 
time recreational away from the premises 
is no the nature 
on which Miss Reinert was injured. It shows 
''That trip had to do with anyone's duties in 
with the camp"; that her superior had "no interest 
activities in their free time" but "just hoped they 
time": that on the afternoon in question "the 
vvas considered free time for 
''checked out and checked in'' ; that the purpose 
1vas ''Just so I lmc1v where 1vere going-
parents came to look for them in an emergency 
" 1\Iiss Reinert testified that it was a "voluntary matter" 
"to decide to go " that "I wasn't busy, 
I would like to go horseback riding, and 
·went to ::Yirs. Scholler and asked her if there is anything 
and she said there wasn't, so I went riding." It thus 
362 HEIC>JER'r v. l"\DUbTitiAL Ace. Cmr. 1-!6 C.2d 
appears that the ''permission'' to which reference is made 
in the opinion amounted to nothing more than per-
mission for the allowance of free time in addition to the 
day and that the employees were ''encouraged'' 
to go horseback only in the sense that they were en-
to use their free time to engage in any recreational 
of their own The employees were not 
to go horseback at any time their 
and Miss Reinert could have decided on the after-
to engage in mountain climbing, boating, 
sun-bathing, fishing, touring in her own 
car, patronizing places of public accommodation or amusement, 
or any other activity which might be enjoyed in the general 
area. It was she who suggested that some of her coworkers 
go with her on their free time on that day, first for a ride 
and then for a swim at a lake located five miles from the 
camp of her employer. Some followed her sug·gestion, and 
others did not, but the fact remains that she and the others 
were at liberty to go wherever they chose and to do anything 
they desired to do. Such activity was typical of the free time 
activity enjoyed by employees generally when relieved from 
the duties of their employment and cannot be said to be ''part 
of the employment.'' 
The cases upon which the majority opinion relies do not 
sustain the conclusion reached therein. Typical of the cited 
cases are those in which injuries have been held compensable 
nndrr certain circumstances when they occurred on premisrs 
of the employer (Pacific Indent. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
26 Cal.2d 509 [159 P.2d 625]; California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 21 Cal.2d 751 [135 P.2d 158]; Winter v. 
Indush·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174 [276 P.2d 689]; 
Employers' etc. CorzJ. v. Industn:al Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 
567 [ 99 P .2d 1 089] ) or at places customarily used as the im-
mediate approaches to the premises of the employer (Freire v. 
Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal.2d 8 [118 P.2d 809]; State 
Camp. Irts. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 28 [227 
P. 168]) or during brief deviations for personal reasons from 
the actual work of the employer, or at a time when the 
employee could be said to be acting both on behalf of himself 
and his employer (Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
31 Cal.2d 856 [193 P.2d 745] ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. 
lnd1tstTial Ace. Corn., 28 Cal.2d 756 [172 P.2d 1]; Western 
Pac. R. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754] ; 
Western Pipe etc. Co. v. IndustTial Ace. Com., 49 Cal.App.2d 
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[46 C.2d 349; 294 P.2d 713] 
) . These cases demonstrate that the courts 
and endeavored to 
rule of liberal construction (Lab. Code, § 3202) in deter-
uu .. ~···,., whether any injury ''arose out of and in the 
of" the employment as by our statute. (Lab. 
§ 3600.) However, courts may not in conscience 
the of the statute under the 
and I am of the that the 
here results in such nullification. 
respect to the letter which was denied admission in 
I agree that it was covered in substance by the 
testimony of Mrs. Scholler; but I do not believe that the 
the word ''compensate,' or ''compensation,'' considered 
context in either the letter or the testimony, would support 
or conclusion that the employee's free time activities 
own choosing, far removed from the employer's premises 
outside of the sphere of any right of control by the 
were "part of her employment" or that the 
in such activities "arose out of or in the course of" 
employment. On the other hand, I am of the view that the 
finding to the contrary was abundantly sup-
by the evidence. 
I would affirm the award. 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
'rhe petition of respondents Central Orange County Girl 
Scout Council and Globe Indemnity Co. for a rehearing 
denied April 18, 1956. Spence, J., Schauer, J., and 
J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
